MSI Working Paper by Luyten, Adriaan et al.
  
MSI_1421 
 
Transnational union cooperation in the 
European metal sector: 
Reinforcing and obstructing factors 
Adriaan Luyten, Christophe Crombez and Raymond De Bondt
 
Transnational union cooperation in the European
metal sector: Reinforcing and Obstructing factors. 1
Adriaan Luyten2 Christophe Crombez3 Raymond De Bondt4
May 20, 2014
1This research was conducted with funding made available by The Flemish Fund for Scientic
Research (Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, Project G.0.483.09.N.10).
2Adriaan Luyten is a doctoral candidate at K.U. Leuven. Adress: K.U. Leuven, Fac-
ulty of Business and Economics, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Email: Adri-
aan.Luyten@econ.kuleuven.be.
3Christophe Crombez is Professor of Political Economy at K.U. Leuven and Consulting Professor
at Stanford University. Adress: K.U. Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economics, Naamsestraat
69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Email: crombez@stanford.edu.
4Raymond De Bondt is Emeritus Professor at the department of Managerial Economics, Strategy
and Innovation of the K.U. Leuven. Adress: K.U. Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economics,
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Email: raymond.debondt@kuleuven.be
Abstract
The literature on unionized oligopoly has demonstrated that unions will generally bent from
cooperation. Despite these benets, most initiatives towards Europeanization of collective
bargaining have been unsuccesful. Some noteable exceptions can be found in the European
metal industry. The European Metalworkers Federation can claim several path-breaking
precedents of cross-border coordination, and is being monitored closely by scholars of Euro-
pean industrial relations. Despite this abundant attention, the reasons for success or faillure
have not been analyzed analytically.
In this paper, we present a model that takes specic charachteristics of the metal industry
into account, such as product di¤erentiation, imports from low-wage countries and di¤erences
in reservation wages. We predict that cooperation will be easier when reservation wages are
similar and when imports are imperfect substitutes. In contrast to the common truth that an
external threat encourages cooperation, we nd that under specic circumstances unions will
be less eager to cooperate when faced with a foreign competitor. Our predictions are in line
with the various levels of transnational cooperation in the automobile, electrical equipment
and steel industries. Furthermore, our results indicate that the opposition of rms and the
reluctancy of the European Commission to support transnational bargaining are generally
justied by predicted changes in prots and overall welfare.
1 Introduction
The history of trade unions reads as a continuous struggle to overcome problems of collective
action. These problems, introduced by John Stuart Mill in the early nineteenth century and
analytically analyzed by Mancur Olson (1965), can arise whenever people believe that they
can receive the benets of cooperation without contributing to the cost. When it is di¢ cult
to detect or exclude free-riders, low willingness to contribute will jeopardize cooperation. In
his seminal work The logic of collective action, Olson specically discusses the conicts
between individual and collective interests in organized labor. If the benets from collective
bargaining are enjoyed by all employees, even a small cost of membership should prevent a
rational employee from joining a trade union. Confronted with the existence of large trade
unions, Olson suggested that in most cases, it is compulsory membership and coercive picket
lines that are the source of the unions membership.
Today, few people would argue that free-riding incentives of individual union members
threaten the continued existence of European trade unions. In many Western European
countries, trade unions have become institutionalized bodies whose role in economic policy-
making is anchored rmly in national legislation. However, cooperation problems often still
exist between unions. For example, a rm-level union that has to accept a decrease in its
real wage level in return for employment, will not take the response of the rival rm or
its union into account (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). This business-stealing-externality has
harmful e¤ects for both unions, but neither of them can credibly commit to nip an upcoming
competitive wage war in the bud. The ability to make credible commitments regarding wage
evolution is an important argument in support of sectoral unions. When unions of rival rms
transfer their negotiation competence to an overarching sectoral body that internalizes the
business stealing e¤ect, both can be better o¤.
The gains from cooperation are especially large in oligopolistic industries. In the past
decades, unionized oligopolieshave attracted the attention of numerous scholars from a wide
variety of elds. Unionized oligopoly models describe interactions between labor and product
markets, and demonstrate how rms, unions, and society as a whole are a¤ected by changes in
union organization, mergers of rms, and so on. Without getting into too much detail, we can
state that if unions are strong and rms have market power, unions benet from coordinating
their wage claims throughout the industry. From a product market perspective, industries
should probably be identied for the whole common market. Yet transnational cooperation
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between unions has not been very successful so far, because national unions are reluctant
to give up their dominant position. The literature on the Europeanization of industrial
relations identied numerous hindering factors, many of which originate from distinct national
traditions and attitudes towards organized labor. The di¤erent structures of national trade
unions and their relationship with national governments and employersorganizations surely
impede the instantaneous transition towards a European system of industrial relations, but if
the gains from cooperation were large enough these impediments would have been overcome
by now. The next question is then, are the gains from cooperation really that large, how are
they distributed between the unions of di¤erent member states, and are there any product
or industry characteristics that impede or stimulate cooperation?
The metal industry is a notable and often analyzed exception where transnational coop-
eration is not a dead letter. The European Metalworkers Federation succeeded in setting up
an international structure that facilitates coordination between unions and acquired a repu-
tation as a reliable mediator in case of industrial conicts. But when we scrutinize specic
cases, we have to conclude that not all sub-sectors use the provided structure to the same
degree. In the automobile industry, transnational cooperation between unions has reached
a much higher level than in the steel industry. Electrical equipment producing rms have
repeatedly played o¤ unions of di¤erent countries against each other, often without much
resistance.
In this paper, we present a unionized oligopoly model that takes di¤erent product market
characteristics of the metal industry into account. In each of the three subsectors, rms enjoy
a certain degree of market power. In the steel industry, the predominant source of market
power is economies of scale. Firms in the electrical equipment and automobile industries on
the other hand, rely on product di¤erentiation to increase their prots. A second important
di¤erence between the subsectors is their exposure to competition from low-wage countries.
While automobile imports are still heavily taxed, the electrical equipment and steel industries
face erce competition from outside the common market. A nal element that we include in
our analysis is geographical concentration of production plants and the degree of reservation
wage disparity that we associate with it. The automobile sector for shows signicant concen-
tration in central European countries, whereas production of steel and household equipment
is dispersed throughout the entire European Union (Brülhart, 2001). In the next chapter,
we discuss the metal sectors initiatives towards European cooperation of trade unions in
detail. Next, we briey discuss how we model the objectives of trade unions and the wage
bargaining process. In the fourth section, we study a simple Cournot duopoly. In section
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5, we take into account that reservation wages may di¤er across unions, and we add a third
rm from a country with lower reservation wages. This rm is non-unionized, and produces
a di¤erentiated product. Section 6 concludes.
2 Europeanization of collective bargaining in the metal
sector
It is not surprising that the unions in the metal sector were the rst to adopt common
wage-setting principles. Firms in the metal sector operate in a strongly integrated European
product market and employ a heavily unionized workforce. A key event that sparked transna-
tional coordination was the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Unions
feared that the national governments who were no longer in charge of their own monetary pol-
icy, would resort to deation of labor costs to preserve their international competitiveness.
To keep downward pressures on salaries in check, unions had no choice but to strengthen
international cooperation. The European Metalworkers Federation played a strong and pi-
oneering role in this respect (Pernicka and Glassner, 2012). In 1993, the EMF adopted a
Statement of Principle on Collective Bargaining Policy, which contained the agreement of
all members to strive for a regular annual compensation for price increases in order to protect
real wages, and to guarantee workers a share in productivity gains(EMF, 1993). In 1998,
this understanding was elaborated in a set of concrete guidelines and quantitative criteria
for collective bargaining, labeled the European coordination rule. The authority to conduct
negotiations remained at the national level however. As a result, the strictness of the imple-
mentation of this rule varies across regions and subsectors. For transnational agreements on
the company level, the EMF went further and developed a procedure for governing the ne-
gotiation process in 2006 (EMF, 2006). This mandate procedure stipulates that negotiations
have to be led by a representative of the EMF. However, the EMF mandate procedure leaves
space for ad hoc changes in the procedural rules, and still relies on the goodwill of EMF
members to cooperate (Müller et al., 2011). When we compare e¤orts and results across
subsectors and geographic regions, the willingness to cooperate does not seem to be evenly
distributed. Initiatives between neighboring countries with similar labor costs seem to be
more successful. Furthermore, unions in the automobile industry have a better track record
in European cooperation than their counterparts in the electrical equipment industry.
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To highlight the importance of labor cost similarity and geographic proximity, it suf-
ces to compare the implementation of the EMFs coordination rule across Europe. To
put the European coordination rule into practice, several regional bargaining networks were
created. Compared to EU-wide initiatives or groups of dispersed countries, these regional
networks proved more e¢ cient. Unions of metalworkers from Nordrhein-Westphalen (Ger-
many), Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg have probably set up the highest degree of
institutionalized bargaining cooperation across all countries and sectors. Other more or less
successful networks were established between unions in the Scandinavian countries (Nordiska
Metall) and between the unions of Austria, Bavaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Hungary (the Vienna Memorandum Group).
Besides geographical di¤erences, it is important to stress that initiatives to coordinate
wage bargaining across borders are not equally successful for all sub-sectors of the metal
industry. We briey discuss two cases that highlight the di¤erent attitudes of the unions of
the automobile and the electrical equipment industries. Both cases are about the renegotia-
tion and implementation of restructuring plans. We consider these cases as emblematic for
unionsdivergent levels of enthusiasm when it comes to transferring bargaining authority to
a transnational level. For a detailed overview of European collective bargaining strategies in
the metal sector, we refer the reader to EMF (2006, 2010), Telljohan et al. (2009) and da
Costa and Rehfeld (2011).
In January 2000 the Ford European Work Council (EWC) signed the rst European-level
agreement in the sector. The goal of this agreement was to protect employees who where
transferred to Visteon, a rm spun of from the Ford Motor Company earlier in 2000. Unions
demanded that Visteon o¤ered the same employment condidtions as its mother company,
including seniority and pension rights. The fact that the agreement was signed at the Eu-
ropean level ended a long period in which plants were being played o¤ against each other
(da Costa and Rehfeldt, 2007, 2010, 2011; Herber and Schäfer-Klug, 2002; Pulignano, 2006).
The common strategy, sometimes described as sharing the pain, was based on three princi-
ples: no plant closures; no forced redundancies; systematic search for negotiated and socially
responsible alternatives. This transnational strategy is often described as a path-breaking
case of successful cooperation. Costa et al. (2012) note that:
"The EFAs signed with GME remain examples of transnational solidarity aiming for
socially responsible restructuring. The EWC, the national unions and the EMF have managed
to preserve solidarity through very di¢ cult times during which opportunities to resort to
national strategies were manifold. Sharing the painproved a successful strategy even though
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there have been tensions and setbacks. Some employee representatives, in particular in the
British and Spanish plants during the 2009 crisis, were tempted to give priority to national
bargaining, but in the end all joined the search for a common European agreement, which was
then implemented at the national level."
The unionsstrategies with respect to the restructuring of Electrolux can serve as a con-
trasting case. Faced with erce competition from low-cost countries, Electrolux announced
a restructuring plan in 2004 (Telljohann, 2008). This plan involved further o¤shoring of
production to low-cost countries (Telljohann et al, 2009). The EMF reacted by launching a
European trade union coordination group, in an attempt to safeguard employment in Euro-
pean plants. This initiative was supported by German and Italian unions, but encountered
strong opposition from the board of directors and the Swedish trade union IF Metall. Un-
like its Italian and German counterparts, IF Metall believed that the negotiations should be
conducted at the plant level, and not at the sectoral or transnational level. The fact that the
delegates from IF Metall agreed with the rms strategy rendered a transnational counter-
balancing response impossible. Telljohann (2009) gives his opinion in a rather unvarnished
manner:
In the case of Electrolux, the EWC has not been able to autonomously identify common
interests and values, to agree on common objectives and, nally, to dene and carry out a
joint strategy. Consequently, the European trade union coordination strategy has failed in the
case of Electrolux. From the standpoint of the European trade unions, the Electrolux case
thus represents a missed opportunity. As a result, the consequences of relocation processes in
the context of the Electrolux restructuring program were dealt with in the context of national
industrial relations. In these cases, trade unions had to resort to adjustment policies.
In the rest of the paper, we build a model that can help explain why some of the initiatives
towards union cooperation discussed above are more successful than others. The rst element
that we incorporate is the di¤erence in reservation wages between unions of EU countries.
We show that it is easier for unions to join forces when their reservation wages are not too
far apart. This nding can help explain the relative success of broad sectoral transnational
cooperation initiatives between neighboring regions and countries, e.g. the Benelux and
Nordrhein-Westphalen. A second element is product di¤erentiation, or more specically the
ability of the employers to di¤erentiate their products from imports produced in low-cost
countries. We nd that this ability facilitates cross-border union cooperation, which helps to
explain the relative success of initiatives in more sheltered industries such as the automobile
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sector, compared to the electrical equipment industry where import competition is strong
and product di¤erentiation is weaker. Before we analyze the e¤ects of coordinated collective
bargaining on these di¤erent oligopolistic product markets, we briey describe how we model
the role of unions in the economy.
3 Trade unionsobjectives and wage bargaining models
In this section, we discuss which factors shape trade unions preferences, and how these
preferences translate into labor market outcomes such as wages and employment. We conne
the discussion to the most applied models of wage bargaining, and refer the reader to Elliot
(1991) or Booth (1995) for a comprehensive overview.
In the literature, there is hardly any discussion about the concept that both wages and
employment are important determinants of the unions utility. Leontief (1946) already dis-
cussed the idea that unions may trade wage increases for increases in employment. The
relative weight that unions attach to wages and employment is not necessarily the same for
all the decisions the union faces. Schultz an Myers (1950) argue that unions are more con-
cerned about the wages of current members when they have to make important decisions.
The variety in the ways in which these elements are incorporated into a specic utility is
enormous. The utility function that we use throughout the paper is
U = (w   w0):l;
where w and w0 denote the wage level and the reservation wage respectively, and l stands
for employment.
This specication is often used in monopoly union models (Dowrick, 1998; Nickell and
Andrews, 1983) and allows us to focus on what happens when unions with di¤erent values
of w0 and/or l coordinate their wage claims.
The literature on wage bargaining distinguishes two broad categories of bargaining mod-
els. In right-to-manage models, the wage level is the only issue in the negotiations. Once
an agreement has been reached, the rms choose their optimal employment level. In e¢ cient
bargaining models, unions and employers bargain over wages and employment simultane-
ously. In this paper, we will stick to the simplest model of bargaining between unions and
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employers: the monopoly union model. In this model, the union -knowing the labor demand
curve- decides which wage claim it will put to the employer. The employer simply adjusts
employment according to this claim while the wage claim is honoured. Since employers de-
termine employment along the labor demand curve, the wage rate must equal the marginal
revenue product of labor. This simple bargaining model allows us to focus on the interplay of
labor market and product market structures, and it is therefore often used in the literature
on unionized oligopoly (e.g. Yang, 1995; Naylor, 1998; Fisher and Wright, 1999; Leahy and
Montagna, 2000; Naylor and Santoni, 2003; Haucap and Wey, 2004; Lommerud, Straume and
Sørgard, 2005; Song and Vanettelbosch, 2006). Apart from the benets of comparability, the
monopoly union model is particularly appropriate for an analysis of the metal sector because
it captures the strength of the European metalworker unions. Furthermore, this assumption
is not too limiting, as evidence indicates that unions frequently stipulate the wage and allow
employers to set the level of employment (e.g. Freeman and Medo¤, 1984).
In this paper, we compare ex-post union utility levels for di¤erent unionization structures
to deduct the unionspreferences over these structures. However, several scholars (e.g. Booth
1995) have argued that unionspreferences are biased towards increasing or preserving the
wage level of their current members. This bias is particularly strong when union leaders
make decisions that are di¢ cult to overturn and have long lasting consequences. A decision
to transfer bargaining authority to a European federation certainly falls into this category.
Furthermore, it can be an e¤ective strategy for a union to delegate wage negotiations to
wage-maximizing union members, as shown in Mauleon and Vanettelbosch (2006). In their
model, workers with a low probability to be made redundant and hence a bias towards wage
preservation will be able to negotiate a better deal when the unions bargaining power is
limited. For these reasons, we also compare ex-post wage levels to deduct preferences over
unionization structures.
4 Wage bargaining and oligopolistic product markets
The relationship between the wage setting behavior of unions and oligopolistic product mar-
kets has been studied before. However, few studies examine the e¤ects of unequal reservation
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wages, and -to our knowledge- none of the studies examine the e¤ects of imports from a non-
unionized rm that produces an imperfect substitute. The combination of these two elements
captures important properties of the European metal industry. In this section, we present an
overview of the most important studies on unionized oligopolies and analyze a basic model
of union coordination in an oligopoly.
4.1 Literature
The literature on unionized oligopolies is extensive, and over the past decades several im-
portant elements have been added to the basic models. The core elements of the literature
were crystallized in a number of seminal papers in the late 1980s (Davidson, 1988; Horn and
Wolinsky, 1988; Dowrick, 1989). Later, topics such as internationalization and optimal ex-
port subsidies(e.g. Brander and Spencer, 1988; Cambell and Vousden, 2000; Mauleon, Song
and Vanettelbosch, 2006; Bastos, Kreickemeier and Wright, 2007), foreign direct investments
(e.g. Zhao, 1995; Zhao, 1998; Leahy and Montagna, 2005; Rocha-Akis, 2006; Mukherjee and
Suetrong, 2007; Hauer and Mittermaier, 2008), innovation (e.g. Ulph and Ulph, 1988, 1994,
1998, 2001; Banerjee and Lin, 2003; Manasakis and Petrarkis, 2005; Mukherjee and Pennings,
2005) and strike activity (e.g. Vanettelbosch, 1997; Mauleon and Vanettelbosch, 1999, 2003,
2005) were studied in depth. We will only discuss the papers that present analyses similar
to our models.
Davidson (1988) studies how di¤erent levels of unionization a¤ect wages in Cournot
duopolies. He nds that industry-wide unions induce higher wages than rm-specic unions.
Industry-wide unions are capable of internalizing the positive externality that exists if unions
are rm-specic. If a rm-specic union obtains a higher wage, the other rm gets more
competitive. This allows the other union to claim a higher wage for its members. The same
reasoning applies when wages are lowered. An industry-wide union does not care about the
competitiveness of a specic rm. Davidson also shows that coordination between unions is
a stable form of collusion. This result conicts to a certain extent with our analyses below.
We show that unions will sometimes prefer decentralized bargaining, and that coordinating
unions can be tempted to end cooperation when market circumstances change.
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) presents a classical industrial economics model with two verti-
cally connected markets. In the upstream market two rm-specic suppliers sell an input to
two rms in the downstream market. The upstream rms can be understood as two unions,
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each selling workers to one of the downstream rms. Our paper has several elements in com-
mon with Horn and Wolinsky. First, unions are assumed to maximize the aggregate wage
bill. Second, negotiations between rms and unions take place solely over the wage rates.
Third, Horn and Wolinskys study is one of the few studies that take substitutable as well
as complementary products into consideration. The authors nd that when the upstream
unions opt for centralization and products are substitutes, wages increase. However, results
are di¤erent when products are complements. Then, with rm-specic unions, an increase
in wages in one of the rms decreases the demand for the product in the other rm and thus
employment. This negative externality is internalized when the unions are centralized.
Dowrick (1989) presents a model of union-oligopoly bargaining to assess the impact of
product and labor market characteristics on prices and wages. He nds that (1) the e¤ects
of union wage coordination depend on the bargaining situation. If bargaining covers only the
wage (e.g. in the monopoly union model), there is competition between rm-based unions
over shares in total industry employment. In this situation, the wage will increase with the
strength of coordination between union bargaining units. However, when bargaining is ef-
cient (i.e. when unions and employers negotiate wages and employment simultaneously),
there is no direct link between wages and employment, which means that there is no incen-
tive for competitive wage-cutting. This implies that union coordination does not a¤ect the
industry outcome. Dowricks model also predicts that (2) the conditions that lead to higher
prot margins will generally lead to higher wages, and (3) collusive product market behavior
increases both wages and prots if bargaining is e¢ cient1.
Bughin (1999) analyzes the optimal choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda under
possible market entry. He shows that an agreement by the union and the incumbent rm
about E¢ cient Bargaining emerges as a Nash equilibrium. He presents some empirical evi-
dence that supports this nding. Vanini and Bughin (2000) study rmsincentives to recog-
nize unions as a way to increase market power. They conclude that such cost-raising strategy
may prevail, but only when both wages and unemployment are in the bargaining agenda.
Thus, unionization can be an interesting commitment device for rm to exert market power,
1If bargaining covers only the wages, however, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between collusion
and wages. Wages are thus at their minimum levels when the industry is perfectly competitive or perfectly
collusive (monopoly). The reason for this is that industry prots are reduced to zero if product markets are
perfectly competitive, and hence each rm will have su¢ cient incentive to bargain the wage to the reservation
level. As collusion between rms increases, two market become more sensitive to cost di¤erentials and each
union has a greater incentive to undercut industry wages.
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which can explain why a rm in oligopoly can still prot from recognizing unions, despite
higher unionized labour costs.
The integration of product markets implies an increase in the number of rms as well
as an increase in the market size. While Dowrick (1989) examines the e¤ects of an increase
in the number of competing rms assuming a xed market size, Huizinga (1993) analyses
the joint e¤ects of a larger market with more competing rms. He uses a setting in which
unions maximize the wage bill and rms compete à la Cournot. He concludes that market
integration can benet rms and unions alike, (only) because the pre-integration bargaining
outcomes are ine¢ cient.
Corneo (1995) presents a game-theoretic model of an internationally integrated product
market supplied by oligopolistic rms and nationally segmented labor markets, distinguished
by country-specic bargaining systems. The presence of country-specic labor institutions is
the feature which distinguishes his analysis from that of Dowrick (1989). He shows that when
a single oligopolistic product market creates a link between country-specic bargaining sys-
tems, wage setting is a¤ected with implications for employment and welfare. Furthermore,
he shows that product market integration does not eliminate international wage di¤eren-
tials resulting from country-specic labor market institutions. Countries characterized by
industry-level bargaining and stronger unions tend to have higher wages and perform less
satisfactorily in terms of employment and welfare. If wage negotiations are centralized at the
industry level for the whole integrated market, incentives for wage reductions are reduced,
and employment increases.
Fischer and Wright (1999) present a model in which two countries are unionized and a
third country is not unionized. All countries charge tari¤s. As forms of trade liberalization,
either one country can lower tari¤s for one other country, or two countries can agree on
bilateral reduction of tari¤s. Finally, also free trade between all three countries is modeled.
In the model, the union sets wages in the upstream market, rms choose quantities in the
downstream market (and thereby employment) and demand for the nal product is assumed
to be linear. When in two of the three countries the unions set wages, only a free trade
agreement between unionized countries increases welfare.
Pagel and Wey (2012) examine the e¤ects of unionswage regimes on their utility as well
as on the welfare of consumers and the prots of the rms. They use a setting in which
four rms compete in a market consisting of two countries (two rms per country). The
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rms are heterogenous with respect to international competition, i.e. in each country one
rm competes only with the other rm of the same country, while the other competes in
the international market as well. Before the rms set prices for their products, the national
unions sequentially decide whether they use uniform or discriminatory wage regimes. They
nd that the unionschoice of wage regime depends on the level of international competition.
When competition becomes very intense a fully decentralized outcome emerges, even though
all agents (unions, rms and consumers) would benet from international coordination of
wage setting regimes. Pagel and Weys (2012) paper has a lot of elements in common with
our analysis. However, there a number of key di¤erences. First of all, they study rms that
compete à la Hotteling, while we study unions coordination incentives when rms compete
on quantity (i.e. Cournot competition). Second, while Pagel and Wey assume that unions
are organized at the national level, we include the possibility of rm-specic unions in our
analysis. Finally, we also discuss the e¤ects of the gap in reservation wages between countries.
4.2 Cournot duopolies under di¤erent unionization structures
In this section, we present models that allows us to investigate the e¤ects of wage bargaining
on prices, output, prots and wages in imperfectly competitive markets. To assess the results
of the interplay between the wage bargaining process and product market outcomes, we
have to decide how to model both the wage bargaining process and the product market
structure. The bargaining process determines which players are involved, the order in which
they move, and the form of the utility functions they maximize. The structure of the product
market consists of the number of rms involved, the degree of heterogeneity of their products,
and their respective place in the production process (i.e. horizontally or vertically related
markets).
The bargaining process between unions and rms will be modelled following the monopoly
union model. Because unions set wages unilaterally, coordination of wage claims is fully
captured by the form of the unionsobjective functions. We distinguish three levels of coor-
dination: decentralization, coordination and centralization. Under decentralized bargaining,
employees are represented by rm-specic unions who maximize the aggregate payroll of the
rms employees. Coordinated bargaining allows the unions of the rms in the industry to
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coordinate their wage claims. The unionscommon objective is to maximize the aggregate
payroll of the industry. Similar to a multi-plant monopolist deciding on output levels for dif-
ferent plants, coordinated bargaining allows the unions to set rm-specic wages depending
on the characteristics (e.g. e¢ ciency) of the rms involved. Under centralized bargaining,
the union covers the entire industry, and has to bargain a uniform wage for all employees
of the industry. Clearly, coordinated and centralized bargaining can only result in distinct
market outcomes if rms are in some way heterogeneous. With respect to the structure of
the product market, we start by examining general models of imperfect competition. In the
next section, we elaborate variations that take di¤erences in reservation wages into account.
In the rst setting we study a general model, without incorporating elements relating to
the European metal industry. The results serve as a benchmark to which we compare the
results of the models in the next section. The setting consists of two rms competing à la
Cournot and facing a unionized labor market. We model this setting as a two-stage game.
In the rst stage, the unions claim the wage level that maximizes their utility. In the second
stage of the game, the two rms simultaneously choose the prot-maximizing output level.
We solve this game by backward induction.
4.2.1 Output choices
Consider a market supplied by two rms. Each rm produces under constant returns to scale
and one unit of output, q, requires exactly one unit of labor, l.
qi = li; for i = 1; 2
qi = li; for i = 1; 2 (1)
The product demand is assumed to be linear of the form:
p = a  q = a  q1   q2 (2)
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where p is the market price and q is the aggregate output. The only variable input
is labor. Both rms maximize their prots ; i.e. they maximize the following objective
functions:
1 = (a  q1   q2)q1   w1q1 (3)
2 = (a  q1   q2)q2   w2q2
Solving this optimization problem yields the following Cournot quantities:
q1 =
a  2w1 + w2
3
(4)
q2 =
a  2w2 + w1
3
4.2.2 Wage determination
Wage determination with decentralized unions Union i faces the following maximiza-
tion problem:
max
wi
li(wi   w0);
subject to (1) and (4) (5)
where w0 is the reservation wage in the sector or country. This union objective corresponds
to a utilitarian union objective and to the maximization of individual union member utility
if union members are risk neutral and union membership is xed (Oswald, 1985). Following
McDonald and Solow (1981), the reservation wage is assumed to be exogenously given.
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Decentralization Coordination / Centralization
union utility 2(a w0)
2
27
(a2 w20)
12
wage a+2w0
3
a+w0
2
output 2(a w0)
9
a w0
6
price 5a 4w0
9
6a+3w0
9
prots rm 1 4
81
(a  w0)2 (a w0)236
prots rm 2 4
81
(a  w0)2 (a w0)236
Table 1: Outcomes for di¤erent unionization structures.
When unions bargain wage rates to be paid by the employers, they must account for the
fact that a higher wage will lower the employers demand for labor. In our model, the union
has perfect information about the production functions and output decisions of the rms.
Because the union can perfectly predict the output level for a given wage, we can express the
aggregate wagebill of the rm in terms of wages.
li(wi   w0) = a  2wi + w i
3
(wi   w0); (6)
where w i is the wage of the employees of the competing rm.
Solving this maximization problem for symmetric rms yields the following equilibrium
wages:
wi =
1
3
a+
2
3
w0 (7)
The second column of Table 1 presents the output, price and prots associated with the
equilibrium wage.
Wage determination by coordinating unions Coordinating unions maximize the ag-
gregate wage bill of all people employed in the sector. While decentralized unions only take
the impact of their wage claims on a single rms output into account, coordinating unions
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also take the e¤ects on other rmsoutput into consideration. As such, coordinating unions
face the following maximization problem:
max
w1;w2
(l1(w1   w0) + l2(w2   w0))
subject to (1) and (4) (8)
This yields the following equilibrium wages:
w1 = w2 =
1
2
a+
1
2
w0 (9)
The third column of Table 1 presents the equilibrium outcomes (output, prices and prots)
associated with these wages.
Wage determination by a centralized union A centralized union monopolizes the
supply of labor in the entire sector, and dictates a uniform wage for all of the sectors
employees. Employers have the right to manage, that is, they can freely choose the level
of employment. Again, we assume that the union is simply interested in the aggregate net
income gain obtained by employed members.
The centralized union solves the following maximization problem:
max
w
(w   w0)(l1 + l2)
subject to (1) and (4) (10)
As we do not yet allow for rm heterogeneity, union coordination and centralization induce
the same wages, output levels, prices and prots.
15
4.2.3 Comparison of wages, output levels, prices and prots for di¤erent forms
of union coordination
The comparison of labor and product market outcomes under di¤erent forms of union orga-
nization, as summarized in Table 1, leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When unions coordinate or centralize their wage claims, wages and prices
are higher and output and prots are lower compared to decentralized wage setting. Under co-
ordination or centralization, unionsutility levels are higher (compared with decentralization)
while rmsprots are lower.
The logic behind proposition 1 is straightforward. When unions coordinate their wage
claims, they form a cartel in the labor market. As a result, the price (wage) of their product
(labor) increases. Faced with higher production costs, the rms lower their output levels
which results in higher prices.
The model developed in this section indicates that unions could get a higher wage if they
coordinate their wage claims. It is therefore surprising that we see so little cross-border
cooperation between unions in oligopolistic markets. In the next section, we introduce a
number of particularities that can partly explain this feature.
5 Heterogenous unions confronted with foreign compe-
tition
In this section, we investigate models tailored to the specicities of the European metal
industry. The main question that we try to answer is whether heterogenous unions are
more likely to cooperate when the industry faces competition from a non-unionized rm.
Unions are heterogenous with respect to reservation wages. First, we briey discuss how
the relative reservation wage (either lower or higher than that of the other union) a¤ects
the unions preferred unionization structure. We assume that cooperation is more di¢ cult
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when preferences are more divergent. Next, we study the central model of this paper, i.e. a
setting in which a unionized duopoly is challenged by a non-unionized entrant. This entrant
produces a di¤erentiated product.
5.1 Di¤erent reservation wages
In this setting, we analyze how di¤erences in reservation wages across countries a¤ect wages,
prots, prices and output levels. An individuals reservation wage is the highest wage rate
at which he or she will not work, or equivalently, the lowest wage needed to accept a job.
This depends among others on unemployment benets, overall wealth and the probability of
nding a suitable job within a reasonable period of time. It goes without saying that the
average individuals reservation wage varies considerably between EU member states. Table 4
displays hourly reservation wages in 13 EU countries, as estimated by Addison, Centeno and
Portugal (2008) using data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-1999)2.
The descriptive literature on the Europeanization of industrial relations is rather pes-
simistic when it comes to collaboration between unions of low-wage and high-wage countries.
This collaboration is being described variously as an activity often of the last resort (Frege
and Kelly, 2004), at best di¢ cult to coordinate (Gennard and Newsome, 2005) and po-
tentially competitive rather than cooperative (Lillie and Martínez Lucio, 2004). The key
element that thwarts cooperation is a discrepancy in reservation wages. Union members
in high-wage countries are understandably worried that cooperative wage bargaining with
a low-wage union will result in less benecial terms of employment. Because of the union
membersfears, union leaders will be reluctant to engage in profound collaboration with their
counterparts from low-wage countries. There are reasons to believe that the discrepancy of
reservation wages is getting smaller in EU countries. Free market forces such as capital and
labor mobility will slowly but steadily decrease this discrepancy. Furthermore, the reduction
2In the EHCP every individual actively looking for work is asked two questions pertaining rst to desired
hours of work and second to the minimum income required to work these hours. The actual questions are:
Assuming you could nd suitable work, how many hours would you prefer to work in this new job?and
What is the minimum net monthly income would you accept to work [these number of] hours a week in this
new job?.
The reservation wage constructed by Addison, Centeno and Portugal (2009) is an hourly net reservation
wage, computed as the ratio of desired net monthly income to the optimal number of hours. This variable
was deated by the respective national consumer price index.
17
Country Hourly Reservation Wage Standard Error
Austria 5.275 1.962
Belgium 6.291 1.774
Denmark 6.644 2.037
Finland 4.529 1.131
France 5.13 1.498
Germany 5.74 1.845
Greece 3.504 1.195
Ireland 5.408 1.778
Italy 5.174 1.471
The Netherlands 6.334 2.032
Portugal 2.885 1.185
Spain 4.103 1.404
United Kingdom 4.61 2.495
Table 2: Estimated reservation wages in selected EU member states.
of wage divergence seems to get a more central place on the political agenda. Jean-Claude
Juncker, the centre-rights candidate for European commission president, recently said he
favors a minimum wage in all EU member states (Die Welt, 03/25/14). Although he adds
that the amount should be set by the member states themselves, he clearly expresses his
concern about di¤erences in labor standards and his intention to act on a European level.
To our knowledge, di¤erences in reservation wages between unions have not often been
modeled in the theoretical literature on unionized oligopolies. There are a number of inter-
esting papers that investigate a related topic, however. Several papers examine the e¤ects
of binding minimum wages in unionized oligopolies. Besides the fact that minimum wages
and reservation wages are clearly distinct concepts, there are two other important elements
that di¤erentiate these papers from our study. First, the minimum wage is assumed to be
binding for all rms in the industry. Second, the minimum wage is typically assumed to be
endogenous, i.e. the result of an agreement between unions and/or rms.
Petrakis and Vlassis (1999) present a model of two unionized rms with di¤erent levels of
productivity. In the rst stage, rms and unions negotiate a minimum wage for the industry.
The rest of the game is identical to our analysis of decentralized unions, i.e. unions make a
wage claim, and rms produce the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities. The authors nd
that the minimum wage will only be binding for the less productive rm. The productive
rm has an incentive to agree to a high minimum wage, because the increase in its market
share overcompensates the lower prot margin per unit. In several follow-up papers, Petrakis
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Utility Union1 Centralization > Coordination > Decentralization
Utility Union2 Coordination > Centralization > Decentralization
Wage1 Coordination > Centralization > Decentralization
Wage2 Centralization > Coordination > Decentralization
Profits1 Decentralization ? Centralization > Coordination
Profits2 Decentralization > Coordination > Centralization
Price1 Coordination > Centralization > Decentralization
Price2 Centralization > Coordination > Decentralization
Output1 Decentralization > Centralization > Coordination
Output2 Decentralization ? Coordination > Centralization
Table 3: Comparison of outcomes under di¤erent unionization structures: di¤erent reserva-
tion wages without competition from importing rm.
and Vlassis (2003, 2004, 2005) uncover the mechanics of this result in more detail. We will
get back to some of their conclusions when we discuss the results of our models.
We repeat the analysis of section 4, while allowing for di¤erences in reservation wages
in the two countries (wh > wl). For the comparison of some unionization structures, the
ordering of wage levels and prots is conditional on the sign of the gap in reservation wages
wres = wh   wl; or the ratio of the reservation wage gap and a market demand parameter
(a  wl):
Demand is again expressed as follows:
p1 = a  q1   q2 (11)
p2 = a  q2   q1
Applying the same methodology as the previous section, we derive expressions for wages,
output, prices and prots for the di¤erent types of union organization. Table 3 compares
wages, prots, output and prices for the three di¤erent types of unionization. The analytical
expressions can be found in the appendix (Table A.2).
The rst two rows of Table 3 indicate that both unions benet from cooperation (either
coordinating or centralizing wage negotiations). The union with the lowest reservation wage
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prefers coordination, while the other prefers centralization. When we look at wage levels,
we see that wages are lowest under decentralization. As the centralized wage level is exactly
between the two wage levels from coordination (cfr. appendix), the choice between coordi-
nation and centralization is a zero sum game if the employees only care about wage levels.
The employees with the low reservation wage prefer centralization, while the other prefer
coordination. We can conclude that in a market without imports, unions benet from coop-
eration. However, when reservation wages vary across countries the benets are not evenly
distributed3.
The comparison of prots shows that the rm whose employees have the highest reserva-
tion wage prefers centralization over coordination. The prot level of this rm in a decentral-
ized unionization structure is most probably higher than under centralization or coordina-
tion4. The rm with the lowest reservation wage unambiguously prefers decentralization over
coordination, and coordination over centralization. We can therefore conclude that if reser-
vation wages di¤er across countries, unions and rms have conicting interests. While rms
prefer a decentralized unionization structure, unions benet from coordinating or centralizing
wage negotiations.
5.2 A non-unionized rm enters the market
In this section, we analyze the impact of the level of substitutability of the imported product.
While imported steel is almost a perfect substitute for domestic steel, this is not entirely the
case for electrical equipment. In the latter industry, European rms managed to di¤erentiate
their products from imports from low-wage countries. Product di¤erentiation is even stronger
in the automobile industry. To keep the model tractable, we assume that the European rms
produce products that are perfect substitutes.
We hence consider a market supplied by two rms who produce a homogenous good.
Both rms are unionized. Unlike the models discussed earlier, a third rm enters the market.
3When national markets are not fully integrated, the bents of cooperation will be lower. When integration
is asymmetric (i.e. some countries export but do not import the product), some unions will prefer not to
cooperate. The results are not reported because they are of little relevance for the metal industry, but are
available upon request.
4The prot level under decentralization is the lowest of the three unionization structures if wres >
35
58 (a  wl); and in between centralization and coordination if 3558 (a  wl) > wres > 1041 (a  wl).
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We assume that this rm is based in a country where reservation wages are lower, and where
unions are absent or not able to raise wages above the reservation wage.
5.2.1 The model
Firm 1 is the non-unionized rm that produces in a low-cost country. Firms 2 and 3 are
unionized European rms. The reservation wages are higher in rm 2 than in rm 3. The
demand functions for the three rms are:
p1 = a  q1   (q2 + q3) (12)
p2 = a  q2   q3   q1
p3 = a  q2   q3   q1
The degree of product di¤erentiation is captured by the parameter , which ranges be-
tween zero and one. If  = 1, the non-unionized entrant produces a perfect substitute for
the products of rms 2 and 3. For a product such as steel plates,  will be very close to 1
indeed. If  = 0, the "entrant" produces an independent product. If unionsincentives for
cooperation depend on the level of ; this way of modelling allows us to investigate two situa-
tions. First, for some products it is reasonable to assume that  increases over time. At rst,
consumers will not consider the entrants product to be a good substitute for the product of
the incumbent rms. Over time consumers become more familiar with the entrants product
which results in increased substitutability. In this situation, unions preferences can change
when  increases. In the electrical equipment industry, imports from low-cost countries have
by now reached a status of fairly good substitutes for European products. For high-tech
products, substitutionability is lower but on the rise. An example could be the entry of
huawei cell phones on the European market. Second, in other markets there may exist an
upper limit on ; i.e. the new product will never reach a certain level of substitutability.
In the automobile industry for instance, German manufacturers can rest assured that their
product will still be considered superior to imported cars in the not too distant future.
Analogous to the previous section, the three rms compete in quantities. The Cournot-
Nash output levels are:
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q1 =   1
22   6 (3a  3w1   2a + w2 + w3) (13)
q2 =   1
22   6
 
2a  4w2 + 2w3   a + w1 + 2w2   2w3

q3 =   1
22   6
 
2a+ 2w2   4w3   a + w1   2w2 + 2w3

5.2.2 Unionization structures and wages
We will discuss the determinants of the wage level in rm 2 in depth, in order to fully
grasp the impact of the unionization structure on prots, union utility, etc. The analysis of
wage level in rm 3 is analogous, as both rms only di¤er in the reservation wages of their
employees.
Under decentralized bargaining, the equilibrium wage levels are:
w1 = wf (14)
w2 =
1
 282 + 34 + 60
 
20a+ 32wh + 8wl   10a + 10w1   6a2
+3a3   33w1   162wh   62wl + 24wh + 4wl
!
w3 =
1
 282 + 34 + 60
 
20a+ 8wh + 32wl   10a + 10w1   6a2
+3a3   33w1   62wh   162wl + 4wh + 24wl
!
with wf ; wh; wl as reservation wage in rms 1 (foreign), 2 (high reservation wage) and 3
(low reservation wage).
First, the wage level under decentralized bargaining depends positively on market size a:
If demand for the rms product increases, the rms labor demand curve shifts outwards.
Because the labor demand curve is downward sloping, the union will react by claiming a
higher wage. This situation is similar to a monopolist who increases the price after a positive
demand shock.
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Second, wages depend positively on all three reservation wages. The own reservation wage
(wh) has the strongest e¤ect, because it enters the unions utility function directly. The other
reservation wages indirectly a¤ect the wage level: if one of these reservation wages increases,
the wage of the rm in question rises. This happens because the union will demand a higher
wage (in rm 3), or because employees are paid their reservation wage (in rm 1). As a
result, the rm in question produces less, which would result in an increase in rm 2s output
if wages were kept at the same level. Because the perceived demand curve shifts outwards,
the union will demand a higher wage. Note that the wage in rm 2 is more responsive to the
reservation wage of rm 1 (the non-unionized rm) than to the reservation wage of rm 3 if
 is larger than 0.65, and vice versa if  is smaller than 0.65. The reason for this is that in
rm 1 the wage equals the reservation wage, while in rm 3 the wage level is an increasing
function of the reservation wage. Firm 3s reservation wage will only have a stronger impact
on the wage level if the competition with the non-unionized rm is limited (i.e. when theta
is low).
Third, the wage level under decentralized bargaining depends negatively on , because an
increase in theta increases competition with rm 1. In order to keep the rm competitive,
unions will have to settle for a lower wage.
Under union coordination, the equilibrium wage levels are:
w1 = wf (15)
w2 =
1
2
a+
1
2
wh   1
4
a +
1
4
w1
w3 =
1
2
a+
1
2
wl   1
4
a +
1
4
w1
Just like under decentralization, the wage level in rm 2 depends positively on the size
of the market. Note that the coordinated wage is more responsive to changes in the demand
parameter a than the decentralized wage.
The wage level under coordinated bargaining depends positively on the unions own reser-
vation wage and the wage in rm 1. The reservation wage in rm 3 has no e¤ect because
the coordination mechanism internalizes the business stealing externalities that are present
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in decentralized bargaining. Suppose that reservation wages decrease in the rm 3 (e.g. due
to a change in unemployment benets), resulting in a decrease in these employeeswages.
Without coordination, the union of rm 2 would have to accept a lower wage to preserve
the rms competitiveness. In the coordinating wage setting regime however, there are no
incentives to adjust the wages in rm 2. A coordinating unionization structure thus fully
internalizes the negative business stealing externality.
Just as under decentralized bargaining, the wage level under coordinated bargaining de-
pends negatively on . An increase in theta increases competition, so in order to keep their
rm competitive unions have to settle for a lower wage.
Under centralization, the wage levels are:
w1 = wf (16)
w2 =
1
2
a+
1
4
wh +
1
4
wc   1
4
a +
1
4
w1
w3 =
1
2
a+
1
4
wh +
1
4
wc   1
4
a +
1
4
w1
The wages from centralized bargaining depend positively on the demand parameter a, and
on the reservation wages. Because both unionized rms are symmetric, the reservation wages
of their employees are equally weighted. The wage equations are hence the same as those
of coordination if we replace the "own reservation wage" in the latter with the arithmetic
mean of the reservation wages in rm 2 and 3. Again, the wage will decrease when product
di¤erentiation decreases.
5.2.3 Wage-oriented unionsincentives for cooperation.
As pointed out above, the wages in the unionized rms are higher under coordination or
centralization than under decentralization. Therefore, decentralized wage-oriented unions
should try to set up some form of cooperation (either coordination or centralization). How-
ever, when it comes to choosing between coordination and centralization the unions have
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opposite preferences. The eventual unionization structure will hence depend on the bargain-
ing process between the unions. We discuss two di¤erent bargaining processes. In piecemeal
bargaining, the starting point is decentralization. If both unions prefer coordination over
decentralization, they move to coordination. Once there, they can move to centralization if
both prefer this over coordination. They cannot move from decentralization to centralization
directly. In all-at-once bargaining, the starting point is decentralization. If both unions pre-
fer both coordination and centralization to decentralization, there is Nash-bargaining over
the lottery that will determine the unionization structure (coordination vs centralization).
The outside option is decentralization. If there is only one unionization structure that both
unions prefer to decentralization, this will be the outcome. If there is no unionization struc-
ture that both unions prefer to decentralization, the outcome is decentralization. When we
study the factual process towards an integrated strategy for trade unions in the European
metal industry, peacemeal bargaining is probably a more realistic depiction than all-at-once
bargaining. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis of all-at-once bargaining is interesting
for two reasons. First, the probabilities of coordination and centralization that constitute
the lottery that trade unions agreed upon give us an idea about the relative strength of their
preferences. Second, even though none of the cooperation initiatives discussed entailed equal
wages for all employees, convergence of (real) wages is occasionally mentioned explicitly as
an objective in their inauguration statements. This illustrates that unions sometimes discuss
some form of centralization, even before any form of coordination exists.
In peacemeal bargaining, decentralized unions rst decide whether or not to coordinate
wage bargaining. As shown above, the wage is lowest under decentralized bargaining. As
a result, both unions agree to move to coordination. The magnitude of the corresponding
increase in wages depends on several factors. We will examine the size of the wage increase
for rm 2, the wage increase in rm 3 is symmetric.
If formerly decentralized unions start to coordinate, wages in rm 2 will rise by:
1
124 1122+240(
 
24   82 + 8 (a  wh) +  44   242 + 32 (a  wl)   35   163 + 20
(a  w1))
The di¤erence between the coordinated and the decentralized wage is larger if di¤erenti-
ation is stronger (i.e. if  is smaller). When product di¤erentiation increases, rms two and
three gain market power. The unions can then behave as an upstream monopolist, and set
a high price (wage) for their product (labor). If di¤erentiation decreases rms 2 and 3 loose
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market power, and the unionsability to set prices in the labor market erodes as well. So
both the decentralized and the coordinated wage level increase with di¤erentiation, but the
coordinated wage level increases faster. The increase in the decentralized wage stems from
the rise in the rmsmarket power. The increase in the coordinated wage stems from the
rise in the rmsmarket power, as well as the ability to capture a larger part of the benets
from this market power.
The di¤erence between the coordinated and the decentralized wage is larger if the wage in
the non-unionized rm is higher. The "gains from coordination" decrease if the wage setting
capacity of the coordinating unions gets more restricted. The increase in wages is also larger
if the reservation wages of the union members are lower. The reasoning behind this result is
straightforward, and analogue to the established fact that the benets from a cartel increase
when marginal costs decrease. Note that the other unions reservation wage has a stronger
e¤ect on the "gains from coordination" than the own reservation wage. The reason for this is
that the own reservation wage has a positive e¤ect on the decentralized and the coordinated
wage, while the other unions reservation wage only a¤ects the decentralized wage.
We conclude that both wage-oriented unions will always prefer coordination over decen-
tralization, and that the wage increase depends negatively on  and w1, and positively on
a; wh and wc. Once coordination is in place, the unions can agree to centralize wage bar-
gaining. They will do so if centralization generates a higher wage than coordination in both
rms. We again analyze the change in the wage level for rm 2.
If formerly coordinating unions start to centralize wage bargaining, wages in rm 2 will
decrease by:
wh wl
4
The di¤erence between the coordinated and the centralized wage will be positive in rm 3,
i.e. the rm with the lower reservation wage. All other factors such as market size, product
di¤erentiation and wages in the non-unionized rm,etc. have no e¤ect. This should not
surprise us, as cooperation was already in place in the form of coordination, and as the rms
are identical with respect to these factors. Because at least one of the unions is worse o¤
under centralization, the unions will not agree to set up a centralized unionization structure
under peacemeal bargaining.
In all-at-once bargaining, decentralized unions can set up a centralized unionization struc-
ture directly. The corresponding change in the wage level of rm 2 is:
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1
124 1122+240(
 
54   362 + 68 (a wh)+ 4 + 42   28 (a wl)  35   163 + 20 (a 
w1))
If we compare this expression with the "gains from coordination" as discussed above, we
see that weights on the own reservation wage and that of the other union have changed. The
e¤ects of an increase in a;  or w1 are the same as above.
The own reservation wage still has a negative e¤ect on the wage increase, but a rise in
the other unions reservation wage has a positive e¤ect. Mathematically, this stems from the
fact that both reservation wages are of equal weight in the determination of the centralized
wage, while the own reservation wage gets a much higher weight in the determination of the
decentralized wage. Intuitively we can think of this as a merger between upstream duopolists.
Once merged, the rm makes an output decision based on the mean of the marginal costs,
keeping in mind that it will have to split the production evenly over the two (identical) plants.
The di¤erence between the pre- and post-merger prices will be larger for the rm with the
lower marginal cost.
In all-at-once bargaining, the outcome will be determined by Nash bargaining. If wh 6= wl,
the solution is a lottery with a probability of coordination 2
2 8
32 10 . This probability increases
with , ranging from 0:8 when  equals 0 to 0:86 when theta equals 1. This is due to the fact
that the sum of the wage increases is larger under coordination than under centralization,
especially if competition with the non-unionized rm is tough.
5.2.4 Unionization structures and union utility levels
In general, the utilities of the unions have the same order over the three unionization struc-
tures as in the setting without the non-unionized rm. The intuition behind these inequalities
hence remains the same. There is however one exception: under certain circumstances, the
union with the lower reservation wage may prefer decentralization over centralization. Before
we compare the utility levels under di¤erent unionization structures, we briey discuss how
these utility levels change with the exogenous parameters. Again, we focus on the rm with
the higher reservation wage. The results are analogue for rm 3.
The utility level of union 2 under decentralization equals:
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2 4
1810 3908+32966 13 5844+27 3602 21 600
 
20a  28wh + 8wl   10a + 10w1   6a2 + 3a3
 33w1 + 122wh   62wl   4wh + 4wl
!2
Union utility increases with the market demand parameter a, the wage in the non-
unionized rm w1, and the reservation wage in rm 3, wl. When theta is below 0.6475,
wl has a stronger impact than w1: The reverse holds when theta is larger than 0.6475. The
reason for this is that in rm 1 the wage equals the reservation wage, while in rm 3 the
wage level is an increasing function of the reservation wage. Firm 3s reservation wage will
only have a stronger impact on the wage level if the competition with the non-unionized rm
is limited (i.e. theta is low). Utility decreases with the own reservation wage wh, given that
utility is expressed as l  (w2   wh)
Under coordination, union utility equals:
1
22 6
 
1
2
wh   12a+ 14a   14w1
  
a  2wh + wl   12a + 12w1 + 122wh   122wl

Utility increases with the demand parameter a, and with the wage in the non-unionized
rm. Furthermore, utility increases with the reservation wage in rm 3, because after an
upward shift in wl, rm 2 will hire more workers at the same wage. Again,utility decreases
with the own reservation wage wh, because utility is expressed as l  (w2   wh):
Centralization nally, yields the following utility level:
1
22 6
 
1
2
wh   a+ 12wc + 12a   12w1
  
1
2
a  3
4
wh +
1
4
wc   14a + 14w1

Again, utility depends positively on a and w1, and negatively on wh. A change in the other
unions reservation wage increases utility if it reduces the distance between the reservation
wages of both unions, and decreases utility otherwise.
5.2.5 Utility-oriented unionsincentives for cooperation
Peacemeal bargaining between the unions starts with a vote on coordination versus decen-
tralization. If we compare the utility levels of these unionization structures, we see that the
union with the lowest reservation wage will always benet from coordination. For the union
with the highest reservation wage, coordination will not unambiguously increase utility.
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If both unions have the same reservation wage, coordination generates a higher level of
utility than decentralization. This result holds irrespective of the degree of product di¤eren-
tiation. However, if rm 3s reservation wage wl decreases, i.e. moves further away from wh
towards w1, coordination will hurt the high-reservation-wage-union of rm 2 if the di¤erence
between wh and w1 is large enough. The maximum di¤erence (wh   w1) that makes coordi-
nation benecial for union 2 (the "treshold reservation wage gap") decreases as wl gets closer
and closer to w1:
The e¤ects of an increase in product di¤erentiation are twofold. First, a drop in  causes
an increase in the treshold reservation wage gap. If products are strongly di¤erentiated,
the participation constraint for rm 2 is less restrictive. Second, a drop in  enlarges the
di¤erence between the utility levels under decentralization and coordination.
If we combine the e¤ects of product di¤erentiation and the di¤erence in reservation wages,
we nd that if product di¤erentiation is weak and reservation wages di¤er considerably the
union with the higher reservation wage will not support coordination. In the electrical equip-
ment industry, these conditions are probably met. Production is dispersed over the entire
EU, and imports are good substitutes for European products. In the case of Electrolux, the
limited enthusiasm of Swedish unions to coordinate their actions with their southern Euro-
pean counterparts may hence be a rational stance, although at the moment other factors were
probably more important. In the automobile industry, strong product di¤erentiation and re-
gionally concentraded production function as a solid safeguard to enduring mutual benets
from cooperation. As long as there exists a fair level of product di¤erentiation, coordination
will increase union utility. This will even be the case if production shifts towards regions
were reservation wages are lower.
The more general underlying logic behind the result that coordination can decrease the
utility of the union with the highest reservation wage is as follows. A coordinating union will
increase wages in both unionized rms, as we saw in the previous subsection. As a result, the
market share of the non-unionized rm increases. The coordinating union realizes that the
price of a wage increase in terms of employment has increased due to the entry of the non-
unionized rm. This price is not the same for the wages in both unionized rms however.
A wage increase in the high-wage rm has a stronger (positive) e¤ect on employment in
the low-wage rm than vice versa. When reservation wages between the two unions di¤er
substantially, it can be benecial to increase the wage in the high-wage rm in such a way
that this rms output is strongly reduced. Even if this entails a utility loss for the high wage
union, the benets for the low-wage rm will sometimes overcompensate this. However, this
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can only be the case when reservation wages in the low-wage rm are not too high compared
too the wages of the non-unionized rm. Otherwise, the new space in the market will almost
completely be lled by the non-unionized rm.
Under peacemeal bargaining, unions can move to centralization once coordination is in
place. In this case, utility of the union with the higher reservation wage changes by:
(wh   wl)((2 
3)(a w1))+22(a wh) 4a+3(wh wl)
162 48 +
2(w2h w2l )
162 48
If both reservation wages are identical, the di¤erence is of course zero. We can conclude
that if the unions have di¤erent reservation wages, the move from coordination to centraliza-
tion will benet one union and hurt the other. These utility gains and losses do not even out,
however. When coordinating unions decide to centralize, the associated utility deadweight
loss equals:
1
8
2 2
2 3 (wh   wc) ((a  w1)  (a  wc)  (a  wh)); for wh  wc:
The deadweight loss increases with , which means that the discrepancy between the
losses and gains from both unions gets larger if the unionized rms are faced with increased
competition from the non-unionized rm.
The analytical outcome of all-at-once bargaining does not allow straightforward inter-
pretation, due to the presence of squared and cubic parameters. We can conclude that
decentralization will prevail when the di¤erence between reservation wages is large enough to
make coordination detrimental to the union with the higher reservation wage. When this is
not the case, coordination will be the more probable outcome because centralization entails
a deadweight loss.
5.2.6 Unionization structures and rmsprots
The focus of this paper is on unions incentives to cooperate transnationally. As several
examples from the European metal industry illustrate, cooperation can be successful if all
parties are convinced that they will benet from it. Even though there are legal limitations
to the Europeanization of industrial relations such as the absence of a right to strike at the
EU level (da Costa et al., 2012), neither the government nor the employersorganizations
can prevent unions from coordinating collective bargaining. However, this does not mean
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that employers and governments have no impact whatsoever on the process of Europeaniza-
tion. Both can stimulate or hinder cross border cooperation. Therefore, we believe it is
interesting to investigate how unionization structures a¤ect prots and total welfare in our
model. We start by comparing companiesprots under decentralization, coordination and
centralization.
Given the production function and demand, the prots of rm i are:
i = (pi   wi)qi
Using the equations of wi derived above, we can express prots in terms of reservation
wages for each unionization structure.
 Decentralization
1 =
1
4(2 3)2(2 6)2
 
 18 (a  w1) + (a  wh) 4 + (a  wl) 4
+(a  w1) 52   3(a  wh)  3(a  wl)
!2
2 =
1
4(2 3)2
(2 4)2
(34 282+60)2
 
(wl   wh) 4 + (a  w1) 33   62(a  wh)
+62(wh   wl)  10 (a  w1) + 20(a  wh)  8(wh   wl)
!2
3 =
1
4(2 3)2
(2 4)2
(34 282+60)2
 
(wh   wc) 4 + (a  w1) 33   62(a  wl)
+62(wl   wh)  10 (a  w1) + 20(a  wl)  8(wl   wh)
!2
 Coordination
1 =
1
16(2 3)2
 
6(a  w1)  (a  wh)  (a  wc)  2(a  w1)
2
2 =
1
16(2 3)2
 
2(a  wh) + 2(wc   wh)  (a  w1)  2(wc   wh)
2
3 =
1
16(2 3)2
 
2(a  wc) + 2(wh   wc)  (a  w1)  2(wh   wc)
2
 Centralization
1 =
1
16(2 3)2
 
6(a  w1)  (a  wh)  (a  wc)  2(a  w1)
2
2 =
1
16(2 3)2
( (a  wh)  (a  wc) + (a  w1))2
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3 =
1
16(2 3)2
( (a  wc)  (a  wh) + (a  w1))2
Under decentralization, rm ones prots depend positively on market size a and the
reservation wage in the other rms. All three rmsprots depend negatively on the own
wage. The prots of rm two depend positively on the reservation wages in the other two
rms. They depend negatively on the own reservation wage.
Under coordination, we note that the prots of rm two depend positively on the reser-
vation wage in rm three. This is because an increase in this reservation wage decreases rm
threes output, while leaving the wage in rm two una¤ected. The prots of rm 2 depend
negatively on theta.
In the case of centralized wage bargaining, the prots of rm one depend negatively on
w1 and positively on wh and wl. Interestingly, the prots of rms 2 and 3 depend positively
on all three reservation wages. Furthermore, the prots of rms 2 and 3 depend positively on
theta. This counterintuitive result can be explained as follows: While a decrease in product
di¤erentiation reduces the unionized rmsmarket power in the nal goods market, it also
reduces the centralized unions wage setting power. An increase in the wage demanded by
the unions renders their rms less competitive vis-à-vis the non-unionized rm. If product
di¤erentiation gets weaker, the unions are more heavily restricted in their wage claims.
If we compare the prots under decentralization and coordination, we can observe that
the non-unionized rm usually benets from union coordination, while the other two see
their prots decrease. The logic behind this result is straightforward. Coordinating unions
increase wages, which results in a lower level of output for the unionized rms. The non-
unionized rm will react by increasing its output and consequently capture a larger market
share. However, this result is not un ambiguously true. In some cases, at least one of the
unionized rms generates more prots as a result of union coordination. Furthermore, union
coordination will under certain circumstances be detrimental for the non-unionized rm.
Generally speaking, union coordination decreases the prots of the unionized rms. If
both unions have the same reservation wage, coordination will decrease prots, irrespective
of the other parameters. Interestingly, a large di¤erence in reservation wages can make union
coordination benecial for the rm with higher reservation wages. Figure 1 shows the areas
in the (a   w1); (a   wl) plain for which this is true (blue). If the other unions reservation
wage shifts towards the wage level in the non-unionized rm, the lower equi-prot line is
tilted away from the X-axis, thereby enlarging the area in which coordination increases the
rms prots. Changes in theta do not a¤ect the lower equi-prot line. If there is a large
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di¤erence between the reservation wages of the two unionized rms however, an increase in
product di¤erentiation tilts the upper equi-prot line away from the Y-axis.
Figure 2 shows the areas in the (a   wl); (a   w1) plain for which union coordination
results in higher prots for the non-unionized rm (blue area). In this gure, the reservation
wages are assumed to be equal in both unionized rms. We can see that a large enough
di¤erence between the reservation wages in the non-unionized rm and the unionized rms
makes the non-unionized rm worse of under coordination (red area). The critical size of
this di¤erence between reservation wages depends on market size, product di¤erentiation,
and the gap between reservation wages of the two unions. However, when the market is large
enough, union coordination will always increase the non-unionized rms prots. If we move
to the north east on a line of 45 degrees from any given point in the (a wl); (a w1) plain,
we will eventually end up in the blue area. When product di¤erentiation increases, both
contour lines are tilted towards the X and Y axis. The blue area will grow, making it less
likely that coordination reduces the non-unionized rms prots.
The circumstances under which a rm can benet from union coordination remain very
exceptional. A more relevant result is that the same forces decrease the loss that rms su¤er
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when unions move from decentralization to coordination. This can easily be seen on the three-
dimensional graphs from which the contour lines are depicted in gures 1 and 2. Our results
predict that rms will oppose unionsinitiatives towards cooperation. This is in line with the
observations from the metal industry (da Costa et al., 2012; Dufresne, 2012). Furthermore,
opposition from rms in areas with higher reservation wages should be the strongest. This
prediction can not be veried empirically, because most rms in the European metal sector
have plants in several regions.
5.2.7 Unionization structures and total welfare
Several authors have noted that the European Commission has gradually retreated from
promoting cross border cooperation (Dufresne, 2012; Schulten, 2013). This stance is often
attributed to the inuence of employers organizations such as BusinessEurope. Schulten
(2013) notes that the Directorate General for Economic and Financial A¤airs advocates de-
centralization of collective bargaining, which is openly criticized by the Directorate General
for Employment and Social A¤airs. It would be inappropriate to assess whether the Com-
missions general position on transnational collective bargaining is justiable by comparing
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the welfare outcomes of our specic oligopoly model. This section should therefore not be
viewed as an explanation for the Commissions policies, let alone a recommendation. Rather,
it is an additional element to complete our study, in line with the tradition of economists to
examine whether the interests of some are reconcilable with the interests of society.
We dene total welfare (TW ) as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and prots, with
CS = a(q1 + q2 + q3)  (q
2
1+2q1(q2+q3)+(q2+q3)
2)
2
  p1q1   p2q2   p3q3.
When compare the total welfare under decentralization and coordination, we see that total
welfare is usually higher under decentralization. Under specic circumstances, decentralized
unions can increase total welfare by starting to coordinate wage claims. These circumstances
are certain congurations of the ve main variables in our model, i.e. the three reservation
wages, the size of the market, and the degree of product di¤erentiation.
The core condition for coordination to be socially benecial is a restriction on the relative
size of the reservation wages. First of all, there has to be a considerable absolute di¤erence
between the reservation wage of the non-unionized rm and the reservation wage of at least
one of the unionized rms. If we study the change in welfare when we move from decentralized
to coordinated bargaining on a three dimensional plot, we get an idea of how the di¤erent
parameters a¤ect the loss or gain in total welfare. The gure below displays the regions
where coordination increases total welfare. The X-axis measures the di¤erence between
the reservation price a and the reservation wage in the non-unionized rm. The Y-axis
measures the di¤erence between the reservation price and the reservation wage in one of
the two unionized rms (rm 2). The two lines are contour lines where total welfare under
coordination is equal to total welfare under decentralization.
If the degree of product di¤erentiation and the reservation wage in the other unionized
rm 3 are held constant, we can interpret the e¤ect of a change in the size of the market. If
the market grows, we move up along the 45 degree line that cuts the original point. Because
the slopes of the contour lines are smaller than 1, decentralization will always generate a
higher level of welfare than coordination if the market is large enough. Furthermore, an
larger market will almost always reduce the social benets of coordination (or increase the
social losses). The only exception is when we are in area C or in the lower part of area B,
and the growth of the market brings us to higher point on the three dimensional hill.
The e¤ects of an increase in product di¤erentiation are twofold. First, the slopes of the
three dimensional plot get steeper. Second, the contour lines move outward. For any point
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in area A these two e¤ects move in the same direction, i.e. if decentralization is socially more
desirable than coordination, it will be so even more when product di¤erentiation increases. In
region B, the two e¤ects partially o¤set each other. The three dimensional hill gets steeper,
but also subsides as the contour plot shifts outwards.
If the reservation wage of rm two decreases, we move to the right. If the starting
point is situated in area A, this means that coordination becomes socially more attractive
compared to decentralization. An decrease in the reservation wage of rm one causes an
upward movement. This makes decentralization more benecial, unless the starting point is
situated in area C.
Finally, the e¤ects of a change in the reservation wage of rm three should be considered.
In gure X, the reservation wages of the unionized rms two and three are equal. If the
reservation wage of rm three moves towards the wage level in rm one, the lower contour
line shifts outwards and area C shrinks. When it approaches the wage level in rm one, a
new area of socially desirable coordination appears besides the Y-axis (Figure X).
If we move from coordination to centralization we observe that, irrespective of the other
parameters, total welfare decreases by 1
8
(wh   wc)2 : The reason behind this result is that
unions can not make wage claims that reect di¤erent reservation wages.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study how di¤erences in reservation wages a¤ect unionsincentives to co-
operate internationally. The literature on unionized oligopoly has demonstrated that unions
will generally benet from cooperation. Despite these benets, most initiatives towards com-
prehensive international cooperation of unions have been unsuccessful. The metal sector is
a notable exception, because there are at least some initiatives that turned out positively.
Investigating which distinct characteristics are responsible for this observation lies outside
the scope of this paper. However, some necessary conditions for cooperation like the presence
of strong unions and a strongly integrated European market seem to be fullled. When we
look deeper into sub-sectors, we observe that unions in the automobile sector are more willing
to cooperate transnationally than unions in the electrical equipment industry. This can be
explained by stronger product di¤erentiation and geographic clustering in the automobile
industry.
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We showed that when unions are heterogenous with respect to reservation wages, they
have opposite preferences over the form of cooperation. Undoubtedly, this will hinder the
swift conclusion of a cooperation agreement. However, no matter how large the di¤erence
between reservation wages is, the unions will still prefer both coordination and centralization
over decentralization. Di¤erent reservation wages can hence not explain why decentralization
is still the prevalent international unionization structure.
Today, the di¤erent labor standards within the EU are no longer the prime concern of Eu-
ropean trade unions. Imports from newly industrialized countries and divestment in Europe
are considered to be the major threats to labor standards. We analyzed how competition
from a non-unionized rm from a low-wage country a¤ects unionsincentives to cooperate.
In contrast to the common truth that an external threat encourages cooperation, we nd
that under specic circumstances unions will be less eager to cooperate when faced with a
foreign competitor. Unions realize that the price of a wage increase in terms of employment
has increased due to the entry of the non-unionized rm. For a coordinating union, this price
is not the same in both unionized rms however. A wage increase in the high-wage rm
has a stronger (positive) e¤ect on employment in the low-wage rm than vice versa. When
reservation wages between the two unions di¤er substantially, it can be benecial to increase
the wage in the high-wage rm in such a way that this rms output is strongly reduced.
Even if this entails a utility loss for the high wage union, the benets for the low-wage rm
will sometimes overcompensate this.
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